

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
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19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACIS		✓		
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SUSPENSE	Date
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Remarks:

3637 (10-81)

Executive Secretary

5/25/82

Date



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAY 24 1982

82-496815

UNCLASSIFIED (SECRET attachments)

MEMORANDUM TO: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke 8214701
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler 8214702
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel 8214703
CIA - ✓
JCS - MAJ Dennis J. Stanley 8214705
OSD - COL John Stanford 8214706
Negotiator - COL Samuel Watson 8214707

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SUBJECT: Reports of START IG Meetings

Attached are summary reports of the START IG meetings
of May 17 and 18.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED
(WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS)

B-223



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

Interdepartmental Group on START Policy

May 17, 1982

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTSStateRADM Jonathan T. Howe,
ChairmanACDA

James Timbie

CIAJCS

RADM William Williams

NSC

Sven Kraemer

OSD

Richard Perle

OVP

LTC Michael Fry

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Negotiator

Ambassador Rowny

The IG met to review the following Working Group papers for submission to the NSC:

1. Interim Restraints: OSD explained its view that our interim restraints regime should distance the Administration from SALT in some way in order to correct the perception that the U.S. is complying with SALT II and to provide a basis for opposing ratification of that treaty. OSD indicated that it would provide language for the NSC paper.

2. Consensus Issues: OSD questioned the use of temporal qualifications in some of the positions (e.g., "at this time"). Other agencies indicated that this was intended to indicate eventual flexibility and was an element of the consensus on those specific issues. OSD did not consider this appropriate.

3. Force Reconstitution: The IG decided to send the paper to the Working Group for detailed review and redrafting.

4. Mobile ICBMs: The Chairman of the START delegation expressed his preference for a ban on mobile ICBMs, so defined as to permit deceptive basing. All others held the

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view that we should make no decision on mobile ICBMs in START at least until the MX basing issue is resolved.

5. Collateral Constraints: The IG briefly discussed some of the issues, but the Chairman indicated that the entire package required further study.

The IG called a Working Group meeting for later that day and another IG meeting for May 18, to complete review of these papers.

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The IG met again to discuss the papers for submission to the NSC.

1) Interim Restraints: OSD indicated its intention to supply new language for its option in time to meet the NSC deadline.

2) Consensus Issues: Recommendations regarding inter-continental cruise missiles and the exclusion of FB-111 were deleted because of disagreement over the inclusion of temporal qualifications (e.g., "at this time"). The recommendation on ICBM rapid reload capabilities was to be relocated in the refire/reconstitution paper.

3) Mobile ICBMs: The IG approved the paper for submission to the NSC.

4) ICBM Reconstitution and Collateral Constraints: The IG decided that these issues were not ready for NSC decision (although in the matter of collateral constraints the NSC would be informed that the IG agreed in principle on the need for counting rules and an exchange of baseline data). The IG and its Working Group would concentrate on these issues with the intention to provide recommendations or options for NSC decision prior to the opening of START negotiations.

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